Kamna Arora
The foreign policies of US President George Walker Bush have often been decried. Undoubtedly, his policies in the Middle East and Latin America have penned blunders in the book of history. But there is one side of the globe that has actually gained under Bush’s Presidency. And this part is -- South Asia. India and Pakistan, the two important players of the region, did get benefits of Bush’s friendship.
Eight years of the George Bush administration witnessed a spectacular alteration in the US’ ties with India and Pakistan. For Bush, alliance with both the South Asian countries, which are traditional rivals, was important to serve his interests in the region.
Let me focus on India and the US first. In a bid to build a unique strategic partnership with India, the US had to make an important modification in its policy, despite opposition.
In 1998, India had stunned the international community by conducting nuclear tests. An angry US President William Jefferson "Bill" Clinton had commenced a global campaign to cut off India from the international community and to force the South Asian country to “roll back” its nuclear weapons programme. Clinton soon calmed but continued to restrain the help for India’s space and nuclear programmes.
The Presidency of Bush brought a noteworthy turnaround in Indo-US ties. According to Robert Dean Blackwill, former US Ambassador to India, even before Bush entered the White House, he was keen to improve and expand ties with the world’s largest democracy and emerging economy – India.
The events that took place later on are hard to explain without focussing on India’s neighbour, Pakistan. The country under the leadership of Gen Pervez Musharraf was not on the list of the US’ friends. But the terror strikes on the US on September 11, 2001 changed everything. Musharraf grabbed an opportunity to become a US ally by offering Washington a base to wipe out Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan. In return, the US vowed to resume military and economic assistance to Pakistan.
When this happened, one thought India lost the game. 9/11 had given a chance to India to prove to the international community that Pakistan-bred terrorism is not only a threat to India, but also to the rest of the world. But Musharaf was a shrewd player. He averted the imminent tragedy of becoming the US’ target so cunningly.
But Bush had something else in his mind. He did not do anything significant for India during his first four years in the White House. He, however, made some moves to lessen high-tech sanctions against India.
Bush’s move to tag Pakistan-based terrorist groups, such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, as international terrorist organisations and then put pressure on Pakistan to contain these groups seem to reflect that Bush’s friendship with Pakistan was just need-based. Strategic analyst Ashley Tellis notes that the relationship of the US with India and Pakistan “would be governed by an objective assessment of the intrinsic value of each country to US interests rather than by fears of how US relations with one would affect relations with the other”.
Later, the Bush administration decided to provide India with frontline American weapons systems, including combat aircraft. According to G Parthasarathy, former High Commissioner to Pakistan, it was for the fist time that a decision was taken to “decouple” American relations with India, on the one hand, and its ties with Pakistan, on the other.
The significance of ties with India and Pakistan were perfectly assessed by Bush when he inked a nuclear deal with India despite opposition, but refused to enter into a similar deal with Pakistan. Amazing to note, one US President (Bill Clinton) made every effort to make India a pariah in the nuclear club, while another (President George W Bush) did not leave a stone unturned to ensure India’s entry into the exclusive guild.
The importance of India as a credible member of international society was underlined when Bush announced, “Pakistan and India are different countries with different histories. So as we move forward, our strategy will take into account these well-known differences.” According to Tellis, “while the US would recognise that India is a country on the way to becoming a major Asian power”, it would also acknowledge Pakistan as “a country in serious crisis” that must be helped to achieve a “soft landing”.
With Pakistan failing to curb militants, Bush reportedly gave approval to US Special Operations Forces in July to accomplish ground assaults inside Pakistan without Islamabad’s consent. The credibility between the two countries is on the verge of failure.
In another development under the Bush Presidency, Parthasarathy noted that ‘whether it is the role of the Maoists in Nepal, the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, or the transition to democracy in Bangladesh, Bush made it a point to consult India closely to find out the latter’s viewpoint’.
Pakistan has just welcomed a new President. As the US is all set to do so in few weeks and India will have a new government next year, it will be interesting to see how new office bearers sustain the new strategic partnership.
