Genesis: The foundation of the Indo-US Nuclear deal was laid when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W Bush initiated talks on civil nuclear co-operation in Washington in July 2005. Then on March 2, 2006, the two leaders signed a civil nuclear co-operation pact, commonly known as 123 Agreement.
Features of 123 Agreement:
One of the contentious part of the Agreement was its dependence on an internal US legislation – the Hyde Act.
The Hyde Act prescribes that before any deal as per section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act for nuclear cooperation with India (which is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) can be operative, the President must submit a report to the US Congress for its approval.
It also expected that India works with and supports the US’ and other international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.
However, more clarifications are sought.
Despite the minor irritants, the Act received tremendous bi-partisan support in the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Why India needs the deal?
The Indo-US nuclear deal, apart from ending India’s three-decade-old nuclear apartheid, opens the door to high-end technology that will help propel industries ranging from pharma to bio-tech and from avionics to manufacturing. Specifically, it would pave the way to energy security for India.
Apart from the above mentioned benefits the deal also gives access to dual use technology that can be used in various industrial and scientific sectors. Some of the dual-use technology and trigger list items that will now be available to India are:
Key players
Apart from India and the US, the key players that played an important role in building international consensus were the UK, France and Russia.
The game plan
Building consensus in India: The deal resulted in an intense political debate in the country with the Opposition questioning the utility of the deal. The Left Front, then an important ally of the ruling United Progressive Alliance coalition, was dead opposed to the deal and saw it as US’ nefarious design to make India a client state. It cited national interests for the opposition of the deal. The BJP on the other hand accused India of a sell-out. The most contentious issue for the opposition was that they felt the government has sacrificed India’s right to conduct further tests at the altar of the nuke deal
The Left alleged that the deal would undermine India’s independent foreign policy and accused the government of hiding certain clauses of the deal, which were inimical to India`s indigenous nuclear programme.
However, the country’s leading nuclear experts and scientists unanimously supported the deal saying that it was very important to end India’s nuclear isolation. Former President APJ Abdul Kalam, who is also a renowned space scientist, was also instrumental in developing a positive opinion in the country, especially within the political class.
Building Consensus in the US: Like India, the deal faced resistance in the US. President Bush personally made efforts to convince the Congress about the justification of the Agreement. Efforts at building a consensus in the US were:
Making the world understand the deal’s importance
Hectic diplomacy preceded the days leading to the crucial IAEA and NSG meet in Vienna. Indian bureaucrats flew to various world capitals to convince the international community about the deal’s importance. Some of the points put forward to bring home the importance of the deal were:
Formal Steps
For the Indo-US Nuclear Deal to become a reality it had to clear three hurdles: India specific IAEA safeguards agreement, NSG waiver and its passage in the US Congress. The first two steps and a part of the third have been completed:
IAEA: On August 1, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors approved the agreement with India. Salient features:
NSG: The meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Vienna went to the wire before India was finally able to get a waiver. Opponents to the deal like Austria and New Zealand wanted to include more amendments in the draft waiver. Highlights of the NSG meet:
However, China, in a very subtle manner, egged on smaller countries to sabotage the India-US Nuclear Deal but shied away from openly opposing the landmark deal for India. China probably fell in line because it did not want to stand alone in denying India the waiver and also because of the pressure mounted by the US.
Deal in US Congress: The final destination for the deal was the US Congress. With the pact enjoying a bi-partisan support, the US House of Representatives approved implementing the 123 Agreement by an overwhelming 298-117 majority.
Later, the Senate also cleared the deal with a majority of 86-13, striking down ‘killer amendments’.
Final Signatures: On October 8, President Bush signed the legislation on Indo-US nuclear deal into law.
And on October 10, the landmark deal was operationalised when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee inked the 123 Agreement.
Emergence of India: It would be naïve to see the deal only as an energy tool. Its implications go well beyond that. India, in one stroke, has joined the world’s high table. India is now the only sixth country after US, UK, Russia, France and China that has been officially recognised as a nuclear power
